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Abstract
Research shows that ethnic minority candidates often face an electoral penalty at the
ballot box. In this study, we argue that this penalty depends on both candidate and
voter characteristics, and that pro-minority policy positions incur a greater penalty
than a candidate’s ethnic background itself. Using a conjoint experiment embedded in a panel study of British voters, we investigate the relative contributions of
candidate ethnicity, policy positions, affirmative action, and voter attitudes to this
electoral penalty. We find that although Pakistani (Muslim) candidates are penalized
directly for their ethnicity, black Caribbean candidates receive on average the same
levels of support as white British ones. However, black Caribbean candidates suffer
conditional discrimination where they are penalized if they express support for prominority policies, and all candidates are penalized for having been selected through
an affirmative action initiative. We also find that some white British voters are more
inclined to support a black Caribbean candidate than a white British one, all else
being equal. These voters (one quarter of our sample) have cosmopolitan views on
immigration, and a strong commitment to anti-prejudice norms. However, despite
efforts across parties to increase the ethnic diversity of candidates for office, many
voters’ preferences continue to pose barriers toward descriptive and substantive representation of ethnic minority groups.
Keywords Ethnicity · Muslims · Candidates · Representation · Prejudice ·
Discrimination
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Introduction
Political underrepresentation of ethnic minorities is a significant problem in many
rich and diverse democratic nations. In Britain, as in Europe and North America,
ethnic minorities are substantially underrepresented in elected office, relative to
the general population (Bloemraad 2013). Underrepresentation has important
negative consequences for minority groups and for societies as a whole. A lack
of descriptive representation reduces responsiveness to constituents (Costa 2017),
and also may reduce substantive representation, as minorities’ interests and perspectives become more easily overlooked if they are underrepresented in legislatures and policy-making processes (Mansbridge 1999). Underrepresentation
may also create broader problems by signaling identity-based exclusion, thereby
undermining political integration, engagement, and efficacy (Merolla et al. 2013;
Street 2014), and increasing political alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003). Further, lack of representation can contribute to mass protest and even riots (Dancygier 2010).
Underrepresentation is clearly a persistent problem, but the causes remain
uncertain. Some evidence suggests that one cause may be “electoral discrimination,” i.e., voters’ biases against minority candidates (Portmann and Stojanović
2018). This study explores this question further, examining the extent and nature
of biases against minority candidates, using data collected from a representative
sample of the British electorate. We leverage a new dataset and research design
that allows us to test not only for direct discrimination, but also for a range of
subtler forms of opposition both descriptive and substantive representation of
ethnic minority groups.
Most simply, we examine the possibility of direct categorical discrimination,
asking whether a candidate’s ethnic minority status leads to reduced electoral
support. We also examine the possibility of several subtler biases that could pose
additional barriers to both descriptive and substantive representation of ethnic
minority population. We ask whether voters directly challenge efforts to enhance
descriptive representation through affirmative action recruitment of candidates,
and likewise whether they oppose enhanced substantive representation in the form
of candidates taking pro-minority positions in two policy areas. Further still, we
explore the possibility of conditional discrimination: do voters impose additional
penalties on pro-minority candidates if the candidate herself has a minority group
identity? Finally, we also address the opposite end of the spectrum of prejudice.
Here, we ask whether some white British voters are so concerned with opposing
prejudice that they actually favor minority candidates over similar majority-group
candidates.
We investigate these questions using a conjoint experimental design, a methodology ideally suited to testing the independent impact of multiple factors on a
single decision, in this case the choice between two candidates in a hypothetical
election. We find clear evidence of both direct and conditional electoral discrimination. Pakistani candidates suffer an electoral penalty on the basis of ethnicity
alone. In contrast, black Caribbean candidates suffer discrimination if and only if
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they take pro-minority policy positions—these stances are generally unpopular,
but are penalized even more when offered by a black Caribbean candidate. On the
other hand, we also find that some voters are positively motivated by anti-prejudice principles to vote for ethnic minority candidates, even in conditions where
they could opt out of choosing altogether.
Our study makes several key contributions to emerging scholarly literatures.
First, we provide the most clear-cut evidence to date about the existence and
degree of discrimination against ethnic minority candidates in Britain. Second,
we advance beyond studies of direct discrimination by showing how voters’ preferences hinder equal descriptive and substantive representation of minority populations, even for groups that do not suffer direct electoral discrimination in the
aggregate. Although our study focuses on a single country, we identify mechanisms of direct and conditional discrimination that may apply more broadly—
minority underrepresentation is a common issue in Western European democracies and electoral discrimination is a poorly understood potential cause. Finally,
we add to the emerging literature on the increasingly important divide in British
politics based on a “cosmopolitan-backwater” dimension (Jennings and Stoker
2016).
Discrimination at the Ballot Box?
Our initial question is, simply, do British voters discriminate against ethnic
minority candidates at the ballot box? While it would be easy to assume that they
do, the prior literature is equivocal. Analysis of observational data suggests substantial levels of discrimination. For example, Fisher et al. (2015) estimate from
survey data that ethnic minority candidates—especially Muslim candidates—suffered a penalty of about four percentage points among white British voters relative to white British candidates in the 2010 general election. Stegmaier and colleagues (Stegmaier et al. 2013), using 2010 general election returns, find that
incumbency advantage increased by two percentage points if the challenger was a
member of a racial or ethnic minority group. Thrasher et al. (2017) find an advantage for local election “candidates whose surnames suggest a British ethnic origin,” while those with non-European names had the largest disadvantage.
On the other hand, even careful observational studies are vulnerable to confounds, and experimental work finds no evidence of anti-Muslim electoral discrimination. Campbell and Cowley’s (2014) survey experiment randomly varies several characteristics of hypothetical candidates for office. They do not find
bias against the Muslim candidate; holding other attributes constant, a candidate
named “Muhammad” fares just as well as “George.” However, reanalysis of their
experimental data (available from authors upon request) shows heterogeneous
effects; some Labour partisans actually appear to prefer a Muslim candidate,
while other groups increase rates of non-response or support for the non-Muslim
candidate. Lacking more information about the identity and preferences of these
respondents, we cannot explain these patterns.
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Categorical Discrimination and Barriers to Descriptive Representation
We begin with the most straightforward hypothesis, which we label the Categorical Discrimination Hypothesis. Majority-group voters may be less likely to vote for
a minority candidate, all else being equal. Several theoretical traditions converge
on this prediction. Categorical discrimination may reflect taste-based prejudice or
“antipathy” toward other groups “based on faulty and inflexible generalization”
(Allport 1954). Outright prejudice—measured as desired social distance from other
groups—has declined over time in Britain, but remains fairly widespread, particularly toward Muslims, who bear the brunt of negative attitudes from other minority
groups as well as from the majority ethnic group (Storm et al. 2017). A subtly different explanation is in-group favoritism, where discriminatory behavior stems from
a preference for one’s own group instead of or alongside prejudice against other
groups (LeVine and Campbell 1972).
In the context of representation, there might be a third, related, explanation for
direct discrimination in vote choice: a desire for descriptive representation among
majority-ethnicity voters. Descriptive representation is usually discussed as having value for underrepresented groups such as women and minorities (Mansbridge
1999), but some evidence shows that members of majority groups have even stronger
preferences for in-group representatives (Gay 2002). In the US case, a substantial
proportion of white voters seem to fear the consequences of descriptive representation of minority groups (Parker and Barreto 2014), whilst some working class white
Americans and Britons explicitly characterize themselves as minority group members and believe that they face discrimination and lack representation (Gest 2016).
For such individuals, the racial or ethnic identity of their representatives may be
important symbolically (Tate 2001).
All of these underlying mechanisms lead to one essential result: a decreased likelihood of voting for a candidate simply due to their membership in an ethnic minority category. This discrimination may stem from prejudice, in-group trust and favoritism, or beliefs about the value of descriptive representation (in a society in which
race and ethnicity are salient identities), or some combination thereof, but in our
context these are observationally equivalent, and therefore can be combined into a
single hypothesis predicting categorical discrimination, or, again, simply that ethnic
minority candidates will draw less support than otherwise identical white British
candidates.
Substantive Representation and Conditional Ethnic Penalties
Although most prior work on electoral discrimination in Britain and elsewhere
looks for categorical discrimination, voters’ biases and preferences can contribute
to the underrepresentation of ethnic minority groups in other ways. We suggest that
ethnic minority candidates may face several forms of conditional discrimination, in
which voters’ discrimination depends on the candidates’ policy positions or other
characteristics.
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First, we propose the Substantive Representation Hypothesis: majority-group voters may oppose the substantive representation of minority interests by any candidate,
regardless of that candidate’s own ethnicity. White voters might resist substantive representation of minority voters’ preferences in line with divergent issue opinions. For
example, data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study and the main British
Election Study show marked differences in support for affirmative action between ethnic minority and white British groups: 70% of ethnic minority respondents favored
improving opportunities for black and Asian people, compared to 20% of white British
(Heath et al. 2013). On immigration, 50% of minorities opposed sending most asylum
seekers home immediately, compared to 39% of the white British—not as stark a difference, but still a significant one. If candidates cannot succeed when promoting policies
that are preferred by more ethnic minority voters, there may be a deficit of substantive representation regardless of whether minority candidates are elected. The phenomenon of symbolic inclusion—where minority candidates are selected primarily for their
appeal to white voters as a symbol of liberalism and not for their strong ties to minority
voters and interests—illustrates parties’ awareness of this dilemma (Dancygier 2017, p.
28).
The Substantive Representation Hypothesis does not entail direct disadvantages for
ethnic minority candidates. In practice, however, opposition to substantive representation would likely disadvantage such candidates, as empirically they are more likely to
seek to represent minority constituents’ substantive interests (Sobolewska et al. 2018).
For example, ethnic minority MPs are more likely to ask official Parliamentary Questions about minority rights and about immigration (Saalfeld and Bischof 2013). Thus,
substantive representation may well go hand in hand with descriptive representation.
In addition, we suggest a potential interaction effect, in which minority candidates
may pay a larger price at the ballot box for taking pro-minority policy positions than
white candidates pay for holding the same view. This possibility—the Conditional
Ethnic Penalty Hypothesis—draws on a “group-centric” view of voters (e.g., Huddy
2018). Candidates’ issue views may convey information not only about the policies
they pursue but also about group loyalties, i.e., whose interests they will tend to represent if elected. As noted above, white voters often fear minority leaders will prioritize minority interests at their expense (Fulton and Gershon 2018). This perception of
minority candidates is particularly difficult to dispel, even with contrary information
about candidate ideology (Karl et al. 2016). If minority candidates promise to promote
minority groups’ interests, white voters may assess a conditional ethnic penalty above
and beyond what a white candidate would face for taking an unpopular policy position.

Methods/Data
Case Selection: Britain
We test these three major hypotheses, along with several extensions described
below, in the context of Great Britain, and more specifically in the run up to the
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2017 general election, which was called three years early and initially centered the
Brexit divide (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018).
Britain is well-established as a multi-ethnic democracy, with ethnic minorities
comprising 10% of the electorate and 10% of the House of Commons.1 In common
with other former European imperial powers, the predominant form of migration to
post-war Britain originated from colonial ties. The largest ethnic minority groups in
the 2011 Census were people of Indian, Pakistani, black African, black Caribbean
and Bangladeshi ethnicity, many of whom were born in the UK (as much as 60%,
in the case of those identifying as black Caribbean). More recent migration patterns
have brought large numbers of immigrants from Central and Eastern European EU
member states; in 2015 the number of Polish-born residents in the UK exceeded the
Indian-born to become the largest country of origin for British immigrants (Rienzo
and Vargas-Silva 2018). Adding to the diversity of the electorate, the UK is unusual
in granting full voting rights to immigrants who are non-citizens if they are citizens
of a Commonwealth country instead, so many minority groups have high levels of
eligibility and participation in elections, with the exception of EU immigrants and
some groups of black Africans without Commonwealth citizenship.
Our study focuses on potential discrimination against candidates of black Caribbean and Pakistani ethnicity, both prominent ethnic minority groups with long and
distinctive histories in Britain, and with high levels of political activity. Initially,
migrants from the Caribbean were directly recruited by the Ministry of Labour for
jobs in professions in the healthcare and transport sectors, whilst Pakistani migration
addressed labour shortages in industries including textiles, engineering and steel.
Later, family reunification policies meant that migration continued despite curbs on
labour migration (Messina 2007). War between then East and West Pakistan—now
Bangladesh and Pakistan—also played a role. In recent years, migration from Pakistan has continued—in particular through student migration (Luthra and Platt 2016),
but that directly from the Caribbean has slowed. Moreover, British Pakistanis are
predominantly Muslim, and thus more distinct from the majority population on religious lines. We therefore expect that stereotypes or antipathy towards one of these
groups may not apply to others.
In particular, we expect Pakistani candidates will receive higher levels of opposition than other minority groups. This is primarily due to high observed levels of
Islamophobia (Storm et al. 2017), likely to be directed at this large, salient and overwhelmingly Muslim ethnic minority group.2 Indeed, the far right in the UK adopted
Islamophobia as a more acceptable form of ethnocentrism than biological racism
(Goodwin 2011). Recent survey evidence suggests lower (though still considerable)
levels of outright prejudice toward black people in Britain than toward Muslims,
with 44% saying that they would personally mind if a close relative were to marry a

1
65 MPs from ethnic minority backgrounds were elected in the 2019 general election of 650 MPs in
total, in line with the proportion of ethnic minorities in the electorate. At the time of fieldwork however
this proportion was only 6% (42).
2
Pakistani ethnicity is especially salient in a British context because a truncated form of the term is a
racial slur frequently used against people of South Asian ethnicity.
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person of Muslim origin, compared to 22% who would mind if the person were of
black or West Indian (an older term for Caribbean) origin (Kelley et al. 2017). Parallel research in the United States suggests that specific prejudice against Muslims
as a group is strongly correlated with ethnocentrism and negative attitudes towards
other ethnic and racial minorities (Sides and Gross 2013; Kalkan et al. 2009). This
heightened and specific anti-Muslim hostility is consistent with research on Britain
suggesting that discrimination, lack of integration, and potential for political conflict remain higher with respect to British Muslims than with respect to other minority groups (Modood 2005). In particular, black Caribbeans as a group enjoy greater
social integration (Maxwell 2010) and fewer discriminatory attitudes (Ford 2011).
Aside from its status as a multi-ethnic democracy, Britain provides a useful setting for this study for two main reasons: (i) ethnic minority candidates stand for all
parties (Sobolewska 2013), and (ii) observational evidence suggests electoral discrimination in British elections (Stegmaier et al. 2013; Thrasher et al. 2017; Fisher
et al. 2015).
Unlike the US, race/ethnicity of political candidates can be disentangled easily
from party membership. Although the Labour party took the lead in fielding minority candidates (electing the first post-war ethnic minority MPs in 1987), the number
of ethnic minority MPs for the Conservative party has increased sharply since 2005,
especially in safer seats with largely white electorates (Sobolewska 2013). This
means that many Conservative minority candidates rely strongly on white voters for
their election. The Labour party also selects more minority candidates in safe seats,
but these safe seats have higher proportions of ethnic minority electors (Sobolewska
2013). Notably, this pattern of running minority candidates in safer seats may suggest that both major parties anticipate some electoral discrimination, and select seats
with lower marginality for minority candidates to minimize the costs of this discrimination as much as possible. This is feasible as central bodies in both parties
exercise a degree of control over shortlists, especially in the shortened timescale
of the 2017 general election (Moisi et al. 2017). However, it also makes it more
difficult to estimate the impact of electoral discrimination from observational data,
since those data arise in part from a strategic process of candidate selection which
itself is affected by beliefs about voter biases. Thus, an experimental test is needed
to determine whether observational evidence of electoral discrimination is substantiated, and to explore whether any discrimination we find is focused on descriptive or
substantive representation.
Study Design
Our data come from a conjoint experiment embedded in wave 11 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) with 7903 respondents (Fieldhouse et al. 2017).
The fieldwork took place between April 24 and May 3, 2017, before the 2017 general election, which was held on June 8 after being called on April 18. The BESIP
recruits a representative sample of the British population (excludes Northern Ireland) from the YouGov online panel, using targeted quota sampling. All respondents
are eligible to vote in at least one type of election (as determined by citizenship
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and age). Surveys are completed in a web browser. In wave 11, the experiment was
fielded to a random subsample of the overall survey.
In the conjoint experiment, respondents were asked to choose between two hypothetical candidates who varied randomly on a series of characteristics, including
party, ethnicity,3 gender, policy position on migration and refugees, priorities for
law enforcement, and their route into politics. Each candidate was described in a
vignette with the following structure, where italicized words inside square brackets
were varied randomly:
[Name] is a candidate in your area from the [Conservative party/Labour
party], who comes from a [white British/Pakistani/black Caribbean] background. [He/She] is in favour of [letting skilled migrants enter the country to
fill jobs in sectors with skill shortages/accepting more refugees who are fleeing
war or persecution/strongly limiting migration to the UK]. [He/She] thinks that
[race equality laws/laws against anti-social behaviour should be more strictly
enforced, with greater penalties for those found guilty of harassment and discrimination/disturbing the public order].4 [Name] became a candidate after
[being included on a list of candidates from under-represented backgrounds/
getting involved in the political party].
The two vignettes were presented on the same page. Respondents were then asked
which candidate they preferred: “Which of these candidates would you rather have
as your MP?”.
By varying all of the candidate characteristics randomly, the conjoint design
allows us to estimate the effects of any one of them, independently of the others and
without bias (Hainmueller et al. 2014). This makes it an ideal tool to test simultaneously for the wide array of hypothesized direct and conditional forms of discrimination. For example, Abrajano et al. (2018) used a conjoint design to study categorical discrimination in the US electoral context, finding substantial effects of ethnic
(Latino) names on candidate preference. Table 1 below summarizes the experimental design, highlighting hypothesized sources of minority candidate disadvantage.
First, varying ethnicity allows us to test for categorical discrimination. Note that
we vary the candidates’ names to accompany the ethnicity (and candidate gender)
manipulations, as naming traditions vary across ethnic groups. White British candidates were named Oliver and Emily, Pakistani candidates were named Omar and
3
Readers unfamiliar with UK might find it helpful to know that White British is a category for ethnicity
in the UK Census, alongside Caribbean and Pakistani. Pakistani as a category falls under Asian/Asian
British, and Caribbean falls under the broader category Black/Black British. This terminology is commonplace, and we believe that participants in the UK would not think that a candidate from a Pakistani
or black Caribbean background lacked citizenship or residence rights. White British is often used to draw
a difference between white people who are native to the UK, those who are immigrants from other European countries, who the Census classifies as White Other, white people who are from Ireland, who the
Census classifies as White Irish, and white people who are from a Gypsy or Irish Traveller background.
4
The wording within this set of brackets represents one randomly-assigned variable, even though there
are two sets of italicized words. The “race equality” treatment used “race equality laws” and “harassment and discrimination;” the “anti-social behaviour” condition used “laws against anti-social behavior”
with “disturbing the public order.”.
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Table 1  Conjoint design, with hypotheses
Candidate attribute

Options

Hypothesized interactions

Ethnicity

White British
Black Caribbean
Pakistani

Minority × IMCP
Minority × neither option

Skilled immigration
Refugee
Strictly limit

Skilled immigration × minority
Pro-refugee × minority

Female × minority

List of underrepresented OR
became involved in party

List of underrepresented × minority

Law enforcement

Enforce race equality law OR
anti-social behavior law

Pro-equality × minority

Gender

Male/female

Party

Labour/Conservative

Entry into politics
Immigration policy

Conservative candidate × minority
Conservative voter × minority

Boldface shows factors with hypothesized negative impact on candidate vote share. Boldface underlined
indicates that we expect Pakistani candidates to have a stronger electoral penalty than black Caribbean
candidates

Fatima, and black Caribbean candidates were named Joshua and Gabrielle. In addition, in case a given respondent was randomly assigned two candidates of the same
ethnicity and gender, we assigned the second name from an alternate list that also
are common for each ethnicity/gender combination: George, Sarah, Mohammad,
Maryam, Daniel, and Kim.
Next, to test the Substantive Representation Hypothesis, we vary candidates’
policy positions. The design allows us to look for the effects of policy positions
independent of candidate ethnicity to test the Substantive Representation Hypothesis. We include two policy areas, immigration and anti-discrimination law, which
are contentious differences in issue positions between majority and minority group
members in Britain in recent years. Immigration in particular has been a highly salient policy issue in Britain since the early 2000s (Blinder and Richards 2019) and
was central in the political dissatisfaction that lead to the Brexit vote (Evans and
Menon 2017), while anti-discrimination law is a much stronger policy priority for
ethnic minorities than white British voters (Heath et al. 2013).
The inclusion of these issues also allows us to test for the conditional discrimination predicted by the Conditional Ethnic Penalty Hypothesis. We estimate interaction effects between candidate ethnicity and policy positions to test for this possibility. The conjoint design also permits a number of additional possibilities, discussed
further below.
Analysis and Population of Interest
The data were unstacked following Hainmueller et al. (2014), so that each row corresponds to one candidate, their characteristics, and whether the respondent said they
would vote for them or not. Each row in the data set is a candidate + characteristics
combination, and the model is of the effect of these characteristics on their selection,
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independent of their opponent. Thus, each participant provided two cases—the
choice to vote or not vote for each of the two candidates presented to them in the set
of vignettes. This means that the 7,903 participants in the study provide double that
number of cases for analysis (n = 15,806).
We use logistic regression to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effect
(AMCE) for each of the candidate attributes varied in the design. We also estimate
interaction effects between multiple candidate attributes (Average Component Interaction Effects, or ACIE) and between attributes and respondent characteristics (conditional AMCE, where AMCE is conditional on the value of a given respondent
characteristic).
Since our population of interest is the British electorate, we analyze the results
from all respondents, rather than selecting only white British respondents. This is
more comparable with studies relying on election returns, and acknowledges that
black Caribbean or Pakistani candidates might face prejudice from voters with other
ethnic minority or white non-British backgrounds. Where appropriate we conduct
a robustness check of limiting the analysis to those identified as white British; this
is used to distinguish support for minority candidates from non-minority voters due
to commitment to anti-prejudice norms, and support for co-ethnic candidates by
minority voters.

Results5
We begin by examining the main effects of candidate attributes on vote choice. We
find, first of all, that support for the Categorical Discrimination Hypothesis depends
on candidate ethnicity. We find clear evidence of categorical discrimination against
the hypothetical Pakistani candidate, as we can see by examining the top three rows
of Fig. 1. These rows show the marginal effect of Pakistani and black Caribbean
candidate ethnicity relative to a white British candidate baseline. Lines indicate 95%
confidence intervals around these estimated effects. The AMCE of Pakistani ethnicity is -0.06 (p < 0.001), for an estimated six percentage point disadvantage, relative
to the white British candidate.
On the other hand, we do not find evidence of categorical discrimination against
the black Caribbean candidate, with an AMCE that is indistinguishable from zero
(b = − 0.003, p = 0.74). As we will show below, black Caribbean candidates suffer
subtler forms of discrimination, but our results do not show a straightforward ethnic penalty. Thus, our results are consistent with previous observational evidence
that only Muslim candidates suffered an ethnic penalty in the 2010 general election
(Fisher et al. 2015), and with work on the particular potency of Islamophobia, over
and above general ethnocentrism, in British political and social attitudes (Storm
et al. 2017).

5
We focus on presenting the most important results in the text and/or visual form. Full tables can be
found in the Supplementary Information.
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Demographics
white British
Pakistani
black Caribbean
Male
Female
Getting involved
List of underrepresented candidates
Immigration Policy
Skilled immigration
Refugees
Strictly limited
Policy
Anti-social behaviour
Race equality laws
Party
Conservatives
Labour
Neither option present
Forced choice
'Neither' option present
-.2

-.15

-.1

-.05

0

Average marginal effects

Fig. 1  Main effects of candidate characteristics on vote choice

Meanwhile, we find strong support for the Substantive Representation Hypothesis. Candidates were penalized for taking positions on both law enforcement and
migration policy that could be seen as providing substantive representation of
minority groups’ interests or policy preferences. Candidates who prioritized enforcing anti-social behavior laws were more popular than the pro-minority position of
prioritizing enforcement of racial equality laws. This is seen in the positive effect of
“anti-social behavior” relative to the “race equality laws” baseline under the heading
“Policy”.
Voters also strongly penalized candidates who took the most liberal position on
immigration policy, which was offering to accept more refugees fleeing war or persecution. This effect was the largest in magnitude of any candidate characteristic in
the experiment, as can be seen by comparing marginal effect sizes in Fig. 1. The
fourteen percentage point penalty (relative to the moderate immigration position)
far outdistanced the largest penalties for candidate ethnicity (six points), affirmative action background (three points), and advocacy for enforcing race equality laws
(seven points). Note that these were average effects for candidates of all three ethnic
groups tested, including white British.
Since ethnic minorities in Britain are more supportive of immigration and refugees, this result exemplifies the difficulty of substantive representation for minority
group interests in a majoritarian system. It is important to note, however, that the
immigration policy position associated with the greatest electoral performance was
not the most anti-immigration position. Rather, support for skilled immigration in
shortage sectors outperformed the most restrictive option, which was “strongly limiting migration to the UK.”
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The size of the effects for immigration policy compared to candidate ethnicity
and other characteristics underlines the salience of immigration to candidate and
party choice at the time of the 2017 election. It may be somewhat reassuring that
policy positions have a stronger effect on hypothetical vote choice than candidate
ethnicity when separated by experimental control. However, as we shall see below,
the importance of policy positions is not entirely good news for minority candidates’
electoral prospects.
Conditional Ethnic Penalties: Black Caribbean Candidates Punished
for Pro‑minority Positions
As discussed above, discrimination at the ballot box may be subtler than simple categorical discrimination. We examine the effects of interactions between candidate
ethnicity and other candidate attributes, by estimating a logistic regression model
that included all candidate attributes, plus interactions between ethnicity and each of
the other candidate attributes. This allows us to test our Conditional Ethnic Penalty
Hypothesis.
The results support the hypothesis: ethnic minority candidates are in fact penalized more than white candidates for offering substantive representation of minority group interests. Voters punished all candidates who took these positions, but the
penalties tended to be larger for ethnic minority candidates. In the case of immigration policy, black Caribbean candidates supporting more generosity toward refugees
rather than a policy of skilled immigration suffered an eighteen point penalty, compared to twelve for white British and thirteen for Pakistani candidates, as illustrated
in Fig. 2. Here, the conditional ethnic penalty seemed focused on black Caribbean
candidates, although it is important to keep in mind that Pakistani candidates begin
from a lower baseline of support, so this difference may simply even things out
between these groups.
Meanwhile, voters punished both ethnic minority candidates more than they punished the white British candidate for supporting greater enforcement of race equality
laws. The coefficient on the interaction term for Pakistani candidates is only significant at the 10% level (p = 0.09), but it is very similar to that for the black Caribbean
candidate, implying a seven point penalty for Pakistani candidates and a similar
eight point penalty for black Caribbean candidates if they support greater enforcement of racial equality laws, compared with just a four point penalty for a similar
white British candidate.
Taken together, then, our main results support all three hypotheses about electoral discrimination. We found evidence of categorical discrimination, although only
against Pakistani candidates. However, we found that voters penalized substantive
representation of pro-minority positions in all candidates, confirming the Substantive Representation Hypothesis. Further, we found Conditional Ethnic Penalties
against black Caribbean candidates in both policy areas, and against Pakistani candidates in the case of policy towards anti-discrimination law enforcement. These differences vary in substantive size, but some are quite large, and all of them are significant enough to make a difference in a close election.
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Immigration policy
.45
Probability of selecting candidate

Probability of selecting candidate

.55
.5
.45
.4
.35

.4

.35

.3
.3
Skilled

Rufugees

Limits

Getting involved

Racial equality laws

Gender

.4

.35

.44
Probability of selecting candidate

Probability of selecting candidate

.5

.45

.42
.4
.38
.36
.34

.3
Anti-social behaviour

List

Race equality laws

Male

Female

white British
Pakistani
black Caribbean
Fig. 2  Effects of candidate characteristics interacted with candidate ethnicity on vote choice

Extensions
In addition to our main hypotheses, our conjoint design allows us to test a number
of additional hypotheses. These are fourfold; (i) opposition to positive action recruitment practices, particularly when used to increase descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups, (ii) further conditional ethnic penalties according to gender and
party, (iii) differential responses to candidate ethnicity depending on political and
normative commitments, and (iv) greater support for minority candidates among
minority voters.
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Attitudes to Affirmative Action
Affirmative action, implemented in the construction of shortlists for potential candidates, is a key means toward increasing descriptive representation in Britain. In fact,
because local party members play a significant role in candidate selection, the main
policy lever for national parties in these efforts is their control over the shortlists
from which local party members select candidates for office. For example, Labour
instituted All Women Shortlists to this effect, whilst the Conservative party used the
non-binding but still reasonably effective “A-list” of preferred candidates to increase
gender balance, ethnic diversity and widen the range of backgrounds represented by
Conservative parliamentary candidates (Dommett 2015). However, although these
methods generated more diverse sets of candidates, little is known about voters’
reactions to them. To address this, we varied whether the candidate was described as
‘being included on a list of candidates from under-represented backgrounds’, or the
more neutral-sounding ‘getting involved in the political party’. Returning to Fig. 1,
we can see that participants penalized direct efforts at descriptive representation of
underrepresented groups, beyond the impact of categorical discrimination; candidates who had “got involved” were 4 points more preferred than ones who had benefitted from positive action. This suggests an aversion to existing efforts to achieve
descriptive representation.
Further Conditional Ethnic Penalties
We also vary gender and party affiliation of candidates to test for conditional discrimination along these dimensions—in particular conditional ethnic penalties for
ethnic minority women (Crenshaw 1989), and ethnic minority candidates from the
Conservative party (Besco 2018). Table 1 above summarizes the variation included
in the conjoint design.
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find evidence for conditional ethnic
penalties for non-policy candidate characteristics. Notably, there was no significant
conditional ethnic penalty for candidates who became involved through affirmative
action recruitment. There were trends in that direction, particularly for black Caribbean candidates, but effects were not statistically significant (b = − 0.11, p = 0.19).
We also did not find evidence for a double penalty for female minority candidates,
as there was no significant interaction between ethnicity and gender.
A different potential conditional ethnic penalty is the role of political party. As
noted above, ethnic minority candidates regularly stand for election in both the
Labour and Conservative parties. Figure 3 plots the marginal effects of candidate
ethnicity interacted first with candidate party, and secondly, respondent’s vote intention. Candidate party does not matter; minority candidates faced no additional penalty as a result of standing for the Conservative party. The voter’s party, by contrast,
does matter. The penalty for Pakistani candidates (compared to white British ones)
is reduced from nine percentage points among Conservative voters to three points
among Labour voters. There is also a small penalty of three points for black Caribbean candidates among Conservative voters (against white British candidates). This
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Fig. 3  Marginal effects of candidate ethnicity by (i) candidate party and (ii) respondent’s vote intention

implies that the party of ethnic minority candidates is important solely because of
the relative levels of prejudice—or, as we will see below, relative support for antiprejudice norms—among voters for different parties. Simply put, minority candidates are likely to fare better as Labour candidates because Labour voters are less
likely to discriminate, not because there is a particular opposition to minority candidates who run as Conservatives.
Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice
In another extension of the main study, we explored the extent to which voters motivated by anti-racist social norms might, in some circumstances, actually prefer an
ethnic minority candidate to an otherwise similar majority ethnic candidate. To this
end, after the vote choice question, respondents were asked two items from a scale
to measure their Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice, validated previously in
the European context (Blinder et al. 2013; Ivarsflaten et al. 2010). Respondents were
asked how much they agree or disagree with the following statements; “I attempt to
act in non-prejudiced ways towards immigrants because it is personally important
to me,” and “I aim to be non-prejudiced towards immigrants due to my own convictions.” Response options were on a five point Likert scale, with a “don’t know”
option. These questions were asked subsequently so that respondents would not be
primed to think about social norms against prejudice while making their choices in
the candidate experiment.
To test whether Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice (IMCP) moderates
the effect of candidate ethnicity, we calculated the marginal effects from a logistic
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Fig. 4  Marginal effects of candidate ethnicity at different levels of internal motivation to control prejudice

regression model where candidate ethnicity is interacted with respondents’ IMCP
score, displayed in Fig. 4. We control for a number of other relevant attitudes6 to try
to avoid concerns that this only identifies ethnocentrism or a lack of prejudice itself.
Our expectations are confirmed; respondents with low levels of IMCP are the most
likely to vote for white British candidates. Conversely, for both black Caribbean and
Pakistani candidates, it is individuals with higher levels of IMCP—that is, a greater
commitment to anti-prejudice norms—who are most likely to vote for them.
Furthermore, looking only at respondents in the top quartile of IMCP, we find
support for the idea that some British voters are positively motivated to vote for
ethnic minority candidates, all else equal. Among this top quartile, we find a positive effect of black Caribbean candidate ethnicity on candidate choice and a positive trend but no statistically significant impact of Pakistani candidate ethnicity. For
black Caribbean candidates the marginal effect is a boost of eight points (compared
to white British candidates); for Pakistani candidates the difference is four points.
This result is robust to removing ethnic minority voters from the sample, eliminating the possibility that positive voting for minority candidates only occurs among
minority voters.
To alleviate concerns that these results may have been affected by the positioning of our IMCP items after the conjoint experiment in which our dependent variable was measured (Montgomery et al. 2018), we replicated these results using an

6
These are the extent to which respondents think that (a) immigrants undermine the welfare state, (b)
immigration is bad for the economy, (c) immigration undermines cultural life, (d) the level of immigration should be reduced, (e) feeling thermometer scores towards blacks and Asians, and (f) respondent
ethnicity.
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alternative moderating variable with similar properties. BESIP respondents were
also asked in the same wave but before this experiment if they think that “immigration undermines or enriches Britain’s cultural life.” Respondents at the high end of
this scale place a positive value on diversity of national and cultural backgrounds,
similar to those on the high end of the IMCP scale. Indeed, the immigration item
may tap even more directly into the emerging values divide along the cosmopolitanism dimension (Jennings and Stoker 2016). Among white British respondents
who agreed most strongly that immigration enriches our cultural life, we find similar
results to the top quartile of the IMCP scale: a statistically significant positive coefficient for black Caribbean candidate ethnicity (5 point advantage), and a positive but
not statistically significant coefficient for Pakistani candidate ethnicity (4 points).
This echoes the analysis of Kalkan et al. (2018), who find in a vignette experiment
that Americans with positive views of cultural outgroups are more likely to support
a Muslim candidate than a baseline candidate of non-specified religion or ethnicity.
We also sought to ensure that these results were not simply an artifact of social
desirability bias. Perhaps high IMCP individuals are not truly motivated to see
improved representation of ethnic minorities, but rather are expressing views that
they believe conform to normative standards of the broader society (or of the survey researchers). Fortunately, earlier waves of the BESIP included the Brief Social
Desirability Scale (BSDS) a widely-used and validated measure of social desirability bias (Haghighat 2007). Due to attrition, this measure is non-missing for 51% of
our participants. First, we use this measure to confirm the distinction between IMCP
and social desirability. We find a small positive correlation between IMCP and
BSDS (r = 0.10). Second, we repeat the logistic regression analysis controlling for
the interaction between BSDS scores and candidate ethnicity, and find that it does
not change the result that higher IMCP predicts greater support for minority candidates, and lower for white British candidates. These results confirm that findings
for IMCP are not a mere artifact of social desirability response bias, in accord with
prior validation studies (Ivarsflaten et al. 2010; Plant and Devine 1998).
Electoral Support for Ethnic Minority Candidates Among Minority Voters
Given the large sample size of this experiment, it is also possible investigate whether
ethnic minority participants preferred ethnic minority candidates. The observational literature on the UK suggests that this occurs only among Pakistani voters, but finds little
evidence for other ethnic groups (Fisher et al. 2015; Martin 2015). To test whether ethnic minority voters prefer minority candidates, we conduct two analyses. Firstly, we test
whether any ethnic minority candidate (i.e., black Caribbean and Pakistani) is preferred
compared to a candidate identified as white British among all ethnic minority voters.
We find that among the 720 observations from 360 respondents who belong to an ethnic minority group, any ethnic minority candidate has a 5 point advantage over a white
British candidate, but this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.14). Secondly,
we test the effects of candidate ethnicity among (i) respondents who are one of Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnicity, or report that they are Muslim, and (ii) black Caribbean,
black African or mixed black ethnicity, in order to identify any co-ethnic preference.
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Among the 136 observations from 68 respondents who are Pakistani, Bangladeshi and/
or Muslim, the Pakistani candidate has a 14 point advantage over a white British candidate, and the black Caribbean candidate a 9 point advantage. Meanwhile, black voters
give a 16 point advantage to a black Caribbean candidate relative to the white British one, and a 4 point penalty to the Pakistani candidate. However, we are cautious to
draw too many conclusions from this result as this is based on 166 observations from
83 respondents. Although the coefficient for black Caribbean candidate ethnicity is significantly different from the Pakistani coefficient, neither of these coefficients are significantly different from the white British coefficient (p = 0.64 for Pakistani candidate
ethnicity and 0.09 for black Caribbean). Moreover, research has shown the unsuitability
of this particular online panel for research on minority voter preferences (Martin 2019).
The ‘Neither’ Experiment
In addition to the main conjoint design, we added an additional experiment within
the vote choice question. The response options on this question were randomly varied
to include or not include an explicit option to choose ‘neither’ candidate. This tested
whether forcing a choice between candidates produces more prejudiced responses. If
true, this would explain the null finding of voter prejudice against a Muslim candidate in the experiment by Campbell and Cowley (2014) which did include a ‘neither’
option, thus reconciling the inconsistencies between experimental and observational
studies in the prior literature.
Contrary to our expectations however, the neither option made only a small and statistically non-significant difference in the likelihood that respondents selected an ethnic
minority candidate. In the forced choice condition, 35% chose a white British candidate, while 30% chose a Pakistani candidate. With the neither option, these percentages
change to 22% and 18%, respectively. Respondents were also no more likely to select
neither candidate when faced with an ethnic minority candidate. Therefore, we have not
been able to resolve the paradox in the UK literature between Campbell and Cowley’s
(2014) experimental null finding and observational studies of ethnic penalties (Stegmaier et al. 2013; Fisher et al. 2015; Thrasher et al. 2017).

Discussion
We have shown that electoral discrimination by British voters poses several distinct obstacles to the election of ethnic minority candidates, and therefore to rectifying the problem of underrepresentation. Electoral discrimination is a disadvantage in and of itself, and also may provide an incentive for strategic elites to
act as gatekeepers against rising minority candidates rather than making positive
efforts to recruit them (Dancygier et al. 2015). Ethnic minority candidates face
several distinct types of penalties at the ballot box, especially if they seek to represent minority group interests substantively.
Our results suggest barriers to both descriptive and substantive representation, with different emphases for the two different groups included in our study as
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candidates. In the aggregate, categorical discrimination reduced support for hypothetical Pakistani candidates but not for black Caribbean candidates. Future work
might explore responses to candidates from other ethnic and religious minority
groups, in Britain and in other European countries as well, to see whether categorical discrimination is the exception or the rule, and whether it is systematically more likely for Muslim minorities than for Europe’s other minority groups.
A second finding suggests an additional barrier to descriptive representation:
heightened opposition to candidates who were recruited through affirmative
action efforts to identify candidates from underrepresented backgrounds. This
finding was race-blind in the experimental context, as voters applied this preference even to white British candidates. Nonetheless, in practice this pattern of
voter preferences still poses an obstacle to increasing descriptive representation.
In the context of actual candidate recruitment by Britain’s largest parties, it is of
course women (through the Labour party’s all-women shortlists) and/or minorities (through the candidate A-list used by the Conservative party) who benefit
from these forms of affirmative action (Dommett 2015). Further, voters might use
ethnicity as a cue to make faulty inferences about candidates’ backgrounds, as
they do about policy positions (Karl et al. 2016). Minority candidates may suffer
electoral discrimination because of assumed affirmative action, even if they did
not personally benefit from it.
We also found two distinct obstacles to substantive representation of minority
voters’ preferences and interests. First, we found support for the Substantive Representation Hypothesis: voters directly penalized the substantive representation
of refugees’ and racial minorities’ interests. Candidates who supported the most
pro-minority positions on both immigration/refugee admissions and enforcement
of race equality law were disadvantaged in our hypothetical election results.
Second, minority candidates—especially those identified as black Caribbean—
suffered a conditional ethnic penalty. Candidates who took substantive pro-minority policy positions were penalized more if they were identified as black Caribbean than if they were white British. This represents a Catch-22 for many black
British voters: the co-ethnic candidates who are most likely to represent their
policy views (and who also provide the advantages of descriptive representation)
are less likely to win an election while holding those views. Conditional ethnic
penalties also have implications for elite gate-keepers, heightening the incentive
to avoid recruiting minority candidates who will represent minority constituents’
substantive preferences and interests, while perhaps providing more of an opening to conservative minority candidates (Dancygier 2017).
The results have further implications for understanding the relative positions of
Europe’s Muslim minorities in comparison with other domestic minority groups. In
the British case, Pakistani (Muslim) candidates face outright electoral discrimination in ways that black Caribbean candidates do not. This is consistent with emerging research suggesting that discrimination, lack of integration, and potential for
political conflict remain higher with respect to Muslims than for other minority
groups across Western Europe (Storm et al. 2017).
Of course, even without categorical discrimination, black Caribbean candidates
still face significant roadblocks. Experimental results indicate that black candidates
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must take significant steps to distance themselves from real or perceived implications of their ethnic identities in order to be treated equally by British voters. In our
controlled, hypothetical context, black Caribbean candidates could evade negative
effects of discrimination on their vote share, but only by refraining from pro-minority policy positions on immigration and law enforcement, and avoiding assumptions
that they benefitted from affirmative action. In real elections, this is much more difficult. In real campaigns, voters, often ill-informed about policy matters, may draw
the sorts of inferences about black candidates’ ideological and policy positions that
have been shown to harm minority candidates’ chances in US studies. And rejecting
substantive pro-minority policies could reduce support from ethnic minority voters
and even among the most anti-racist white voters. Nonetheless, these barriers appear
more permeable than the categorical discrimination facing Pakistani candidates.
Generalizability
The principal threat to the generalizability of our results is that they come from an
artificial survey experiment environment. This is a limitation of any study of this
type; however, in this case we are reassured that our results concur with the observational evidence on ethnic penalties in British elections. But beyond basic questions
of external validity, we are also interested in exploring how these results might be
applicable—or at least testable—in other national contexts. We expect our results
regarding electoral discrimination to be especially relevant in contexts where individual candidates are important—i.e., elections run under single member district
plurality rules or proportional representation systems with explicit voting for or
against candidates. Indeed, we have noted parallels between our results and studies
of anti-Muslim sentiment and political behavior in the US.
However, we also note that the broader questions surrounding the policy representation of minorities and affirmative action can be highly salient issues in
elections regardless of the electoral system. The UK’s situation in this regard as
a multi-ethnic European democracy where ethnic diversity and immigration are
highly salient and politicized debates is far from unique, and increasingly European elections are defined by issues of immigration and multiculturalism. Our
results support and extend the literature regarding the on-going reorientation of
British and European politics around a cosmopolitan-communitarian dimension
(Hooghe and Marks 2018), also identified by Jennings and Stoker (2016) as the
“cosmopolitan-backwater” geographical values divide, and connected to the politics of the “left behind” or “losers of globalization” (Kriesi et al. 2012).
Pro‑minority Voting and the Values Divide
Despite finding significant levels of ongoing discrimination, our study uncovers
some positive signs for supporters of racial and ethnic equality. First, only a small
percentage of voters applied these categorical and conditional ethnic penalties
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in their hypothetical voting decisions. Policy variables had substantially larger
effects than candidate ethnicity did. This is perhaps cold comfort, since even a
small shift in votes can be decisive in a competitive election, and any real or perceived disadvantage faced by minority candidates can be magnified through influence on party elites’ gatekeeping at the candidate recruitment stage.
More importantly, we also find evidence of a positive motivation among some
white British people to act in a pro-minority manner. Voters with high levels of
IMCP (the top quartile) provide a small advantage to minority candidates, suggesting a positive value for descriptive representation or diversity. At the same
time, for voters at the other end of this spectrum or even in the middle, minority
ethnicity is still a disadvantage. In fact, the aggregate non-effect for black Caribbean candidates gives a misleading picture of neutrality: in truth, black candidates were disadvantaged among voters at lower ends of the IMCP spectrum and
at a slight advantage among those at the higher end.
Scholars have used the cosmopolitan-communitarian divide to understand
Europeans’ views of immigration (Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009), EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2018), and Brexit (Hobolt 2018). We would simply
add that analagous disputes over the value of diversity and racial/ethnic equality
have broader implications for domestic electoral politics and political integration.
British voters are divided on whether descriptive and substantive representation
of ethnic minority populations is a positive goal to be pursued, an outcome to be
avoided, or an irrelevant consideration. Further, by linking the issue of underrepresentation and electoral discrimination to the broader values divide literature,
we reframe the issue of minority representation in a subtle but important way:
broadening support for descriptive and substantive representation of minorities
depends not only on reducing prejudice, but also on generating affirmative support for diversity and anti-prejudice as positive values.
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